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Theories formulated by Russian psychologist and educator Lev Vygotsky currently range 
from being applied and celebrated across multiple contexts to be considered outdated. In 
this paper, we maintain that such inconsistency in application stems from the overreliance 
on translated or reformulated Vygotskian theories, the attempts to understand these ideas 
in isolation from the scientific historical context of their development, and the impact of 
Vygotsky’s personal life circumstances on the development of his scholarship. It is known 
that Vygotsky’s untimely death prevented him from elaborating on his theoretical views and 
expanding his early empirical work. We suggest that Vygotsky’s scholarship could be better 
understood in light of the core principles that transcend all aspects of his work. In this paper, 
we elaborate on two such core principles: theories of language development and their relation 
to the integrated systemic approach to psychological development. We argue that although 
linguistic and historical boundaries have shaped the common perception of Vygotskian 
theories in anglophone research in a specific way, there is a potential for a renewed application 
of these theories to modern psychology that might be especially relevant in light of the 
increasingly interdisciplinary character of the modern science. To support our argument, 
we provide a brief overview and examples of potential connections between Vygotsky’s 
scholarship with contemporary landscape in psychological science. The paper presents a 
brief introduction to the topic of Vygotskian work and its application to modern psychology, 
rather than an addition to the field of Vygotskian scholarship. It is geared toward non-Vygotskian 
scholars and invites researchers working in interdisciplinary areas of psychology.
Keywords: psychological science, history of psychology, Vygotsky, systems approach, language development, 
culture, developmental science
INTRODUCTION
Concepts developed by Vygotsky have transcended time and geographical boundaries. Today, 
his work is widely applied to many fields of inquiry ranging from psychology (Saxe, 1990/2015; 
Burman, 2016) to language education (Lantolf, 1994; Lantolf et  al., 2018). While this embrace 
of the Soviet psychologist’s thought is a cause for celebration, a number of scholars have 
stressed the lack of application of Vygotskian thought to contemporary psychological research 
(Stetsenko, 2016). As scholars working in interdisciplinary fields ourselves, we  believe in the 
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potential for broader applications of Vygotsky’s work. At the 
same time, we  would like to acknowledge an extensive field 
of Vygotskian scholarship that exists to this day. Indeed, those 
specialists who have in-depth knowledge of his work and theory 
will not likely find anything new or surprising in this paper. 
Our intent is not to outline the Vygotskian project in its 
entirety, as his research embraced topics spanning from clinical 
aspects of development to applied aspects of educational practices; 
neither do we provide a nuanced application of Vygotsky’s 
work to specific research questions nor present a detailed review 
of how Vygotsky’s work has been implemented previously. 
Rather, we  seek to inspire interdisciplinary conversations and 
encourage non-Vygotskian specialists to engage with his work 
and consider its relevance for their own research. In fact, 
we  have intentionally situated this article in an open access 
journal as an act of knowledge brokering between these different 
disciplines and different scholars. With this intent in mind, 
we  do not limit our discussion to one particular aspect of 
Vygotsky’s work. We  intentionally organized our paper around 
broadly defined research themes. We  hope that this would 
help the readers to identify those areas of research where they 
could apply Vygotsky’s work or engage with Vygotsky’s ideas.
To assist our readers, we  begin with a brief overview of 
the context of Vygotsky’s work that had significant influence 
on the way it can be  understood today. We  maintain that 
Vygotsky’s work should be  conceptualized holistically, as a 
research program that was broad in scope and governed by 
fundamental research questions on the nature and development 
of the human mind. To this end, we  address the two core 
principles of Vygotsky’s work: the systemic approach to the 
study of mind and the social origin of the mind. We  conclude 
with some recommendations regarding pertinent applications 
of Vygotsky’s work as it relates to contemporary research in 
psychology. The end result is thus a text that is rather eclectic 
conceptually. We  encourage our readers to address different 
parts of the text that they might find more relevant or interesting 
and further engage with some in-depth accounts of his work 
provided by Vygotskian scholars.
APPLICATIONS OF VYGOTSKY’S WORK: 
ISSUES AND CHALLENGES
Vygotsky has been dubbed the “Mozart of psychology” (Toulmin, 
1978). However, his original work has often being rewritten 
or modified by other “composers” by adjusting or sampling 
the original work, especially in cases of translation. Therefore, 
it might be  useful to understand how Vygotsky’s work has 
been taken up by the global research community and, to 
continue the metaphor, how his music (that is, his theoretical 
contribution and research questions) was performed and by 
whom. For example, we  have observed that translated works 
of Vygotsky that are widely available today are often a 
de-contextualized aggregation of texts, which had a complex 
history of publication in their original Russian. While the 
historical context of his scholarship is fascinating and warrants 
a separate discussion beyond the limits of this paper, we  feel 
that a brief historical overview of Vygotskian research is needed 
to situate this paper within modern psychological discourse.
First, as noted by Van der Veer and Yasnitsky (2016a,b) 
and Zavershneva (2016), a complete and accurate bibliography 
of Vygotsky’s work is yet to be created. The existing Vygotsky’s 
bibliographies often contain significant limitations (Van der 
Veer and Yasnitsky, 2016a,b). As the result, we cannot accurately 
establish how much Vygotsky wrote himself. It is known 
that Vygotsky’s texts were not always written and sometimes 
consisted of notes rather than well-formulated and 
polished texts, and a significant portion of what is known 
as Vygotsky’s work was published posthumously. In other 
words, Vygotsky did not collect and organize these specific 
pieces of text in the order in which they are found today. 
Moreover, as noted by Yasnitsky (2011a), some texts that 
appear under Vygotsky’s name were redacted prior to 
publication while in other texts portions from different 
manuscripts were inserted. Furthermore, a significant portion 
of Vygotsky’s work has not been published at all, and these 
archival works have become accessible to a broader audience 
only recently (Zavershneva, 2010, 2014, 2016).
Second, Vygotsky’s texts underwent various levels of censorship 
during his life and posthumously. It is a well-known fact that 
in the Soviet Union, research papers were severely censored 
to make them more agreeable to Marxist ideology. In fact, 
Vygotsky’s own students censored some of his texts when they 
rose to prominence in the field during the 1960s and 1970s 
(e.g., Luria, Leontiev). Consequently, these scholars used 
Vygotsky’s texts to promote their own work, omitting the parts 
that were less relevant to their respective research paradigms 
and in so doing contributed to the establishment of so-called 
canon of “Vygotsky school” (Fraser and Yasnitsky, 2016; 
Yasnitsky, 2016a).
Third, publications of Vygotsky’s work in the Western press 
resulted in significant changes to the original work due to 
language editing. For example, Cole, John-Steiner, Scribner and 
Souberman, the editors of Mind in Society (Cole et  al., 1978) 
acknowledged that they took “significant liberties” with the 
original texts while preparing them for publication. This appears 
to have been done partly to make them more “digestible” and 
understandable for a Western audience.
The notion of translation is extremely important for the 
appropriate presentation of Vygotsky’s ideas to a non-Russian-
speaking audience, and careful translations of Vygotsky’s texts 
are currently becoming an area of study in its own right. 
We  refer interested readers to the work of Van der Veer and 
Yasnitsky (2016a,b) for a review of core Vygotskian semantics. 
Readers can also refer to Zavershneva (2014) for a “phraseological 
toolkit” that can assist a reader with essential terminology of 
Vygotskian texts. More significantly, in our opinion, the 
translation of Vygotsky’s original Russian texts into other 
languages adds a layer of difficulty to the accurate application 
of his work. We maintain that Vygotskian texts could be better 
understood if studied within the context of the Russian school 
of psychology and the specific terminology and apparatus of 
this school. For example, differences in the semantics of the 
core concepts “mind,” “psyche,” and “cognition” in Russian and 
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English open the door for interpretation, as was highlighted 
by Bruner (1962), who used the word “image” for the Russian 
word “znak.” We  feel that the usage of “image” in this context 
could lead readers to different connotations that are rather 
distant from the more appropriate word “sign.”
In sum, when Vygotsky’s texts were adapted by his students, 
translated, and published in international journals and books, 
some pieces of his “music material” were omitted. Other pieces 
“sang” too loudly. However, this situation is not the only 
obstacle to interpreting Vygotsky for Western readers. What 
is crucially important is that Vygotsky was writing his “music” 
during a particular time. This period is important both in the 
larger historical context and the specific context of developments 
in the field of psychology, which occurred differently in the 
West and Soviet Union. As a result, some notes and musical 
pieces might be  unclear to listeners unaware of the specific 
contexts of their creation.
THE CONTEXTS OF VYGOTSKY’S WORK
Researchers have defined at least three major periods of Vygotsky 
work. The early period took place at the start of the 1920s. 
The middle period began in the mid-1920s and continued 
until late 1927 or early 1928 at which time Vygotsky significantly 
reevaluated his earlier ideas. The final and arguably the most 
productive period began in 1929 and continued until mid-1934. 
By this point, Vygotsky’s health was rapidly deteriorating, and 
he  was well aware that he  might not live long enough to 
finish his work. This period for Vygotsky was characterized 
by a more focused theoretical work and less concern for the 
meticulous testing of newly developed hypotheses. We  suggest 
that the seemingly lack of precise experimental work is not 
attributed to any perceived unimportance on Vygotsky’s part. 
Indeed, this focus on theoretical work in the last period of 
his life may be  better explained by his desire to leave enough 
theoretical instruments and ideas to his students, who could 
in turn develop and test his ideas experimentally.
Regarding the specifics of Vygotsky’s life as a researcher, 
we  suggest that a reader of early and late Vygotsky will not 
necessarily encounter the same scholar. The three major periods 
of Vygotsky’s work demonstrate varied levels of focus on different 
topics, changing research programs, and shifting theoretical 
perspectives. Consequently, we  suggest that a single, unified, 
well-developed theory of Vygotskian theory and methodology 
is untenable. Rather, there are “several Vygotskies” (Van der 
Veer and Yasnitsky, 2016a,b), depending on the period of 
Vygotsky’s work. Moreover, as Toulmin (1978) notes, Vygotsky’s 
work in psychology was unfinished; he  did not have an 
opportunity to refine his ideas and present them in any final, 
exhaustive theoretical form. However, our interpretation of 
Vygotsky suggests that while his career took different turns 
over the years, it was always guided by general, fundamental 
questions, such as the structure and origins of human mind. 
We  maintain that other aspects of Vygotsky’s work, such as 
his interest in defectology, abnormal psychology, and experimental 
work in comparative psychology, should be  understood as 
leading to an answer for his ultimate research puzzle: the 
genesis of human mind.
In our opinion, a more accurate understanding of Vygotsky 
is impossible without an appreciation of the temporal context, 
which framed Vygotsky’s work and the global social contexts 
of psychological sciences at that time1. We begin our discussion 
with the focus on temporal contexts.
Temporal Contexts
Vygotsky started his research career soon after the October 
Revolution of 1917, which impacted the entire trajectory of 
his career. The revolution brought tremendous changes to every 
aspect of Russian social life, including research and academic 
endeavors. The revolution impacted science and academia in 
Soviet society in at least two major ways: the newly established 
government threw their support behind scientific research, 
including research on child development, and established a 
political ideology that impacted all aspects of Russian society, 
including science. Since the government established the rules, 
the new ideology defined what a “right” or “correct” society 
was expected to look like, how it was supposed to function, 
and what individuals in the society were supposed to do. In 
the academy, limits were imposed on what scientists could 
claim in their research, how phenomena could be  examined 
and explained, and what conclusions were in line with the 
established ideological framework2.
Guided by the ideology of the time, Vygotsky embarked 
on a metaphorical boat that was sailing toward a new goal – 
the creation of a new man in a new socialist society. Large 
populations, such as factory workers, women, and agricultural 
workers, who previously had limited access to schooling, were 
now able to pursue an education. Tasked with educating such 
a large number of people who were illiterate or minimally 
literate, the Soviet educational system grew exponentially. This 
increase in the number of individuals seeking an education 
required innovative scientific approaches, both regarding general 
science of child development and applied approaches. The old 
ways of being had been abolished and the new society required 
different approaches to education, namely a shift in the science 
of child development. Within this context, Vygotsky’s work 
was marked by a significant paradigm shift, both in the system 
of social class interaction and by fundamental shifts in 
scientific inquiry.
Throughout his entire career, Vygotsky’s work was influenced 
and constrained by the changing political climate. For example, 
1 A complete description of the scientific landscape available to Vygotsky during 
his lifetime is beyond the scope of this paper. There are some excellent 
publications on the topic (e.g. Van der Veer and Yasnitsky, 2016a,b; 
Yasnitsky, 2016a).
2 This situation might rightfully be viewed as restrictive and limiting to scientific 
inquiry. However, in our opinion, it would be  incorrect to suggest that this 
context erases any value of research conducted during that historical period. 
Science has never been free from the ideological and political climate of the 
time. Consequently, scientists were never completely immune from any given 
political and ideological climate (Aleksandrov and Kirdina, 2012). We  believe 
that rather than perceiving Vygotsky’s work as limited by existing ideology, it 
may be  more accurate to highlight specific aspects that were shaped by this 
historical period of time.
Vasileva and Balyasnikova Vygotsky’s Thought
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 August 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 1515
in 1929, he embarked on a research expedition to Soviet Central 
Asia together with Luria and a group of students. Despite 
coming to interesting results, upon completion of the research, 
Vygotsky was unable to publish and share his work. Even 
Luria himself, as a well-respected scholar in the Soviet academy, 
could not publish their joint conclusions until many years 
later (Lamdan and Yasnitsky, 2016). A possible cause for this 
stagnation was that the interpretation of the data was not 
likely favorable for the young Soviet government and did not 
meet the guidelines set by the ideology of the political changes 
in the region. Another example of the contextual limitations 
on Vygotsky’s work was the fact that it could not be  published 
due to the naming of specific individuals in his manuscripts. 
The 1930s and the decade that followed were characterized 
by increasing tendencies of isolation from Western science. 
This led to the demise of extensive reliance on foreign research 
programs, methods, and theories by Soviet scholars. At the 
time, extensive citation of foreign names in the work of Soviet 
scholars was perceived as unpatriotic and in certain contexts 
could in fact be  detrimental to one’s career. Readers are likely 
familiar with the name Leon Trotsky, a once celebrated communist 
who was subsequently proclaimed an enemy of the regime. 
Vygotsky cited Trotsky in some of his manuscripts, and it is 
apparently this citation that barred the work from publication 
(Fraser and Yasnitsky, 2016). It is necessary to note, however, 
that although this situation impacted Vygotsky’s work, it cannot 
be perceived as an absolute. Vygotsky himself (and his students 
after his death) collaborated with foreign scholars. Thus, their 
research never developed in complete isolation from Western 
psychology (Yasnitsky, 2012a,b, 2016b).
Further examples of contextual influences can be  seen in 
the trajectory of Vygotsky’s research on child development. As 
mentioned above, the Soviet educational system was tasked 
with educating large groups of underprivileged children (war 
orphans, poor or working-class children, and the homeless). 
All these children had to become new members of the society: 
they had to be  educated, socialized, and provided with 
professional training that could make them into productive 
members of the society. As such, the Bolshevik government 
supported scientific research, discovery and understanding of 
the basic laws of development, and application of this knowledge 
for the development of practical methods of education and 
rehabilitation for underprivileged children. This led to 
development of a new research discipline – pedology. The 
science of pedology – a particular direction in Soviet research, 
which aimed to unite the approaches of various sciences 
(medicine, biology, psychology, etc.) to the method of child 
development – was tasked with meeting this challenge. Pedology 
provided a scientific foundation for the entire educational 
system, aiming to discover and understand the basic laws of 
development. Pedology sought to apply this knowledge to 
practical methods of education and rehabilitation for 
underprivileged children. The mandate was to make these 
children “normal” members of society despite their initial 
impoverished backgrounds. The belief was that should these 
children be  provided with the right social environment, such 
as an educational system attuned to their needs, the hardships 
the children have experienced might not have profound, 
unchangeable consequences for their future.
Overall, the relationship between Vygotsky’s work and political 
climate of the time was a tumultuous one. The primacy of 
the environment over innate tendencies was dear to the Bolshevik 
government. Thus, Vygotsky’s work, with its focus on the social 
origins of the mind and the environmental impact upon it, 
was initially well received. With governmental support, 
pedological institutions were established throughout the country 
and new classes for teachers and educators were opened. 
Vygotsky himself considered pedology of the utmost importance 
in his own work, as the discipline dealt with questions that 
were central to his interests. However, despite such a favorable 
start, the discipline of pedology failed to thrive in the Soviet 
Union (Kozulin, 1984). It became an outcast, and the government 
halted pedological research.
Regardless of the government’s reasoning, the decline of 
pedology had a profound impact on Vygotsky’s work. Researchers 
with a vested interest in pedology had to disassociate themselves 
from the discipline. Some shifted their research programs to 
defectology (a discipline more closely aligned with special 
education and investigating development of children with visual, 
hearing, and mental impairments); some focused on child 
clinical psychology and psychiatry; and others turned to 
physiology or pedagogical research (Yaroshevsky, 1993). This 
massive departure from pedology did not occur rapidly; however, 
it had a profound impact on the careers of many researchers. 
Previous research programs were not halted entirely but had 
to be  significantly transformed. Scholars were required to 
reformulate their research questions and methodology and 
corroborate with new host disciplines. Much more significant 
was the fragmentation of previously established research groups. 
Members now found themselves in different institutions affiliated 
with different disciplines. As a result of these changes, the 
close-knit Vygotskian Circle formed in 1927–1931 eventually 
dispersed throughout different disciplines and geographical 
locations (Yasnitsky, 2016b).
Therefore, we  conclude that the context of time had a deep 
impact on the development of Vygotsky’s school of thought. 
By decontextualizing Vygotskian theories, contemporary 
researchers might overlook the ideology which guided his work. 
Moreover, by selectively applying Vygotsky’s ideas to the contexts 
of their work, many researchers may risk overlooking the 
changes that Vygotsky made to his own theories.
Social Contexts
The nature of Vygotsky’s collaboration with colleagues and 
students had a profound impact on his science. This is why 
we  argue that one needs to acknowledge the social context 
of Vygotsky’s work as foundational to the development of 
his theories.
First, it is known that Vygotsky worked closely with a number 
of like-minded researchers – both his peers and students – and 
conducted joint experiments with them. The core of the so-called 
Vygotskian Circle consisted of the Big Three – Vygotsky himself, 
Luria, and Leontiev – and the Big Five – first generation students 
of the three: Zaporozhets, Bozhovich, Levina, Morozova, and 
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Slavina. All of them spent years working intensely with Vygotsky 
and were clearly influenced by his ideas3. The cross-pollination 
of ideas sometimes gets omitted in viewing Vygotsky as an 
autonomous, independent thinker.
Second, it is important to consider the trajectory of Vygotsky’s 
work as it was taken up after his death. After Vygotsky’s passing 
in 1934, his colleagues continued working on their own research 
programs, bringing Vygotskian thinking to wider audiences. 
Vygotsky’s ideas and fundamental beliefs did not truly vanish 
with the author’s death but continued to develop in later years. 
The Vygotskian Circle was instrumental in publishing and 
promoting Vygotsky work posthumously (especially Luria, who 
contributed to translating Vygotsky’s work in English and 
disseminating those ideas to the international research 
community). Several of Vygotsky’s students published their 
own works shortly after his death (see for example Sakharov, 
1994). Although these students published content under their 
own names, the works were based on close collaboration with 
Vygotsky or research he  conducted himself. Consequently, 
we  can consider some of these publications to be  Vygotsky’s 
work to a large extent. By focusing exclusively on works 
authored by Vygotsky alone, we  could be  excluding a large 
corpus of research that is de facto an extension of his 
original thought.
All Vygotskian Circle researchers have developed their own 
research programs, as we have mentioned earlier. For example, 
Luria further worked in clinical psychology and psychopathology, 
studying memory and aphasia, and Leontiev developed his 
Activity Theory (Leontiev, 1978). Thus, not all aspects of the 
Vygotskian Circle are a direct continuation of Vygotsky’s ideas. 
Some features of their theories are less dependent on Vygotsky 
and represent a departure from his way of thinking. In some 
cases, this separation started even before Vygotsky’s death and 
was known to Vygotsky himself. For example, scholars working 
with the Vygotsky archive (Zavershneva, 2010, 2016) have found 
notes, stating that he  perceived Leontiev’s development of 
Activity Theory as a departure from Vygotsky’s own ideas. 
We  would like to reiterate that the Vygotskian Circle can and 
should be  viewed as a development of Vygotsky’s thinking 
and not simply as its linear extension. Indeed, within the works 
of the members of the Circle, there are multiple varied 
engagements with Vygotsky’s original thought. While some of 
Vygotsky’s colleagues stayed close to his original ideas, others 
took a significant departure from them.
CORE PRINCIPLES OF VYGOTSKY’S 
WORK
In section 3 of the paper, we discussed various reasons preventing 
Vygotsky from finalizing his theory in the complete operational 
form. We  suggest, however, that despite changes and shifting 
focuses in research, Vygotsky has always followed two core 
3 Some of the works that showcase the productivity of these collaborations 
include: Vygotsky and Luria (1993), Vygotsky and Leontiev (1932), and 
Leontiev (1931).
principles: systemic approach to the development of mind and 
the role of language in this process. In our opinion, these 
principles are crucial for understanding Vygotsky’s overall 
theoretical standing and the motivation for his work. Thus, 
we  suggest that those who are embarking on the application 
of Vygotskian work in their own practice might benefit primarily 
from understanding and operationalizing these core principles, 
instead of addressing specific aspects of Vygotsky’s work or 
rely on his published texts. Moreover, we  suggest that 
incorporation of these two principles has profound implications 
for about every aspect of psychology. To this end, we  discuss 
how these principles can be  applied in various branches of 
modern psychology as well as other disciplines, such as education 
and language studies.
The First Core Principle: Systemic 
Approach to the Development of the Mind
The first core principle of Vygotsky’s approach to the research 
of psychological functioning is the application of a systems 
perspective. Vygotsky continuously stressed that it is a mistake 
to study psychological functions individually, e.g., to study 
development of memory or development of perception. He argued 
that researchers should address the change in the relationships 
between various functions (Luria and Vygotsky, 1930/1992). In 
other words, according to Vygotsky, the new object of research 
should be  not individual functions, but psychological systems.
A systemic approach in the sciences generally stands in 
opposition to the reductionist approach (Toomela, 2015). In 
the field of psychology, for example, the reductionist approach 
is commonly associated with Cartesian thinking and modular 
approaches (Toomela, 2003). While a discussion of this 
opposition is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth 
noting that Cartesian thinking generally postulates a separation 
of studies of mind and body, which in modern scientific 
discourse means an opposition between psychological and 
biological processes. What is important to consider, given the 
focus of this paper, is that Vygotsky clearly did not embrace 
this dichotomy. For him, a developing organism (for example, 
a human being) could not be  reduced to either its biological 
or social environment. A comprehensive study of child 
development for Vygotsky had to employ a systemic approach 
that included both bio-social and bio-psychological aspects 
of development.
Drawing on a systemic approach in sciences, Vygotsky viewed 
a unified system as consisting of interdependent elements 
(Toomela, 2015). In this system, every element has properties 
that are subject to that system’s function, and no element can 
be  changed without affecting the whole system. At the same 
time, the system itself is viewed as more than a collection of 
its individual elements, which change properties when they 
become parts of a system. Following the systemic principle, 
Vygotsky saw elements of the human mind as having precursors 
in animal cognition (Zorina and Smirnova, 2006). However, 
he argued that the human mind becomes qualitatively different 
once it becomes semiotically mediated. That is, the basic 
processes of psychological functioning (e.g., memory, decision-
making, formation of behavioral programs) acquire new 
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properties as they are mediated through symbols. Emotions, 
affect, decision-making, and memory acquire specific qualities 
once they become a part of the general cognitive system. An 
important aspect of a system is its hierarchical organization. 
This means that elements comprising a system are interdependent 
and organized in a particular manner, with some elements 
being subordinate to other either structurally or functionally. 
In the earlier period of his work, Vygotsky believed that 
psychological functions in the human mind are also organized 
in a hierarchical system. He distinguished between elementary, 
primitive, lower psychological functions (LPF) that humans 
share with other animals (e.g., mammals), such as memory 
and concept formation, and higher psychological functions 
(HPF) that are characterized by semiotically mediated processes 
and include decision-making, speech and language, and cultural 
transmission of knowledge. Vygotsky suggested that in the 
course of individual development, initially isolated LPF merge 
with developmentally older HPF.
Some criticism of Vygotsky’s work might stem from ignoring 
or misinterpreting the systemic principle. For example, Wertsch 
and Tulviste (1992) take issue with Vygotsky for not explaining 
how LPF affect HPF in development. As Toomela (2014a) points 
out, such criticism in fact ignores the systemic approach taken 
by Vygotsky and applies Cartesian cause-effect thinking. In 
Vygotsky’s interpretation, mental functions comprising the system 
change qualitatively in development. This is why within this 
framework it is impossible to state with certainty how LPF 
affect HPF, as the former cease to exist in the previous form 
and become different, culturally mediated psychological processes.
The application of a systemic approach lead Vygotsky to 
another very important conclusion: since psychological functions 
are organized in hierarchical systems, developmental processes 
become central for understanding the human mind. The crucial 
role of developmental processes in the system as a way to 
understand the system itself is a direct consequence of a 
principle of systemic organization: when a component becomes 
part of a system, both the properties of the new whole and 
the properties of the component change (Vygotsky, 1932/1960; 
Koffka, 1935; Kohler, 1947). Vygotsky argued that once new 
components enter the system, they affect the system in general 
and all other components of this system accordingly. For 
example, once a child masters language, its psychological 
functions become semiotically mediated and thus change their 
qualities, becoming higher psychological functions. This principle 
was essential for Vygotsky, who maintained that the structure 
of the mind cannot be  understood by researching the mind 
of an adult. To know what a mind system is, we  need to 
observe mind development in a child. It is not enough to 
observe only the final product of these processes. The system 
structure and functionality can only be  understood through 
system development. In the following section, we highlight how 
Vygotsky’s systemic approach to understanding of developmental 
processes has been utilized across disciplines.
Applications of the First Principle
As mentioned above, Vygotsky stressed the importance of 
understanding developmental processes as a system. Indeed, this 
is relevant to several psychological disciplines and 
interdisciplinary research today.
The first area where systemic principle is applicable is 
developmental research. In contemporary developmental 
psychology, Vygotsky’s systemic perspective comes in contrast 
with nativism, which suggests that pre-linguistic infants possess 
a number of psychological abilities in the early stages of 
development (Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Hamlin, 2013, etc.). 
Nativist studies are unified by a core-knowledge theory 
framework, postulating that human psychological abilities are 
largely innate or pre-formed. Nativists postulate that psychological 
processes in individual development increase quantitatively 
rather than change qualitatively. According to Vygotsky’s systemic 
perspective, psychological processes are organized as hierarchical 
and interconnected dynamic systems, which provide for the 
heterogeneous nature of the human mind (Vygotsky, 
1931/1983a,b; Vygotsky and Luria, 1931/1994). As such, 
he  suggested that not all psychological mechanisms emerge 
simultaneously but that one’s existing psychological abilities 
develop qualitatively. Since the nativist perspective suggests 
that psychological processes change quantitatively, from a 
systemic perspective, it is a-developmental. If psychological 
abilities are present from birth and development is conceptualized 
as quantitative addition of computational power, nativist 
perspective has difficulties explaining observed variations in 
development. As Subbotsky (2014) puts it, it is not clear, why 
a 6-year-old does not demonstrate certain reasoning abilities, 
when an infant (according to the nativist perspective) does. 
Similarly, a number of scholars (e.g., Carpendale et  al., 2013) 
expressed criticism to the nativist approach, suggesting that it 
lacks an explanation of truly developmental processes.
Taking up Vygotsky’s theories, memory development in a 
2-year-old, a 3-year-old, and a 5-year-old cannot simply 
be  measured by “how much” memory is “added” at each 
developmental stage. In the systemic framework, the structure 
of memory for a 5-year-old is qualitatively different from the 
memory of a 3-year-old. Therefore, instead of studying the 
development of memory, as a uniform ability throughout 
childhood, in Vygotskian framework researchers can address 
formation of “qualitatively different memories.” A systemic 
framework also calls into question a common approach adopted 
by nativism research methodology, namely, the search for the 
initial stages of a given psychological ability in development. 
Questions such as at what age morality appears or whether 
preverbal infants understand false-beliefs – adopted by this 
framework – are meaningless in a systemic perspective. The 
“morality” of an 8-month-old infant is structurally and 
functionally different from the morality of a 5-year-old, and 
both would differ from that of an adult. In a systemic approach, 
rather than questioning the age at which ability X emerges, 
it is more appropriate to investigate which aspects of ability 
X change as they enter other functional systems, to what extend 
do they change, and under what environmental influences.
The problem of qualitative change in development discussed 
by Vygotsky relates to a hotly debated question in psychology: 
whether or not the discipline has methodological tools that 
can adequately capture developmental processes. Vygotsky (1997) 
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noted that in an attempt to analyze the mind, psychological 
science tends to dissect its higher forms and structures into 
primary elements, ignoring the problem of quality, which cannot 
be  reduced to quantitative differences. We  believe modern 
psychology would benefit from applying the Vygotskian standard 
to research. Valsiner and Van der Veer (2014) suggest that 
the application of Vygotsky’s Zone of Proximal Development 
(ZPD) at the conceptual level might provide developmental 
psychologists and educators with a new approach to assessing 
and measuring developmental processes. Valsiner and Van der 
Veer’s suggestions echo the current discussion of the replication 
crisis in psychology (Earp and Trafimow, 2015) and a call for 
revisioning methods and statistical apparatus widely used in 
psychology today. Some researchers suggest this crisis might 
be  resolved with improvements in general theory and the 
adoption of alternative statistical techniques. For example, 
Valsiner and Van der Veer (2014) and Toomela (2015) argue 
that psychology has adopted inferential statistics that are 
conceptually inadequate for investigating psychological processes. 
Similarly, a number of developmental researchers (van de Schoot 
et  al., 2014) argue for the adoption of Bayesian statistics in 
developmental research.
At least two major discussions in Vygotsky’s neuroscientific 
approach are the structural composition of the brain and the 
relationship between the brain and its environment. 
Advancements in modern neuropsychology and neuroscience 
are indeed remarkable; however, some researchers criticize 
modern neuropsychology for its reductionist approach to human 
cognition (Toomela, 2014b). Specifically, this criticism focuses 
on two main aspects of reductionism: the structural organization 
of psychological processes in the brain and an implied assumption 
that a careful description of the brain’s structure can be enough 
for our understanding of human psychology. We  suggest that 
Vygotsky’s scholarship can be useful in addressing such criticism. 
As Toomela (2014b) suggests, in the search for a neurological 
basis of behavior, researchers tend to focus on determining 
which area of the brain is responsible for processing psychological 
function X. This approach is associated with a modular account 
of the human brain structure and the assumption that it is 
possible to determine (more or less precisely) a relationship 
between specific brain areas and respective psychological 
processes. Theories on the “modular mind” vary from the more 
extreme (e.g., “the Swiss-army knife”) model of the mind 
(Pinker, 1997) to more inclusive (Gazzaniga, 2004; Geary, 2005). 
However, the underlying assumptions tend to remain the same. 
Research programs aim to localize precise areas of the cortex 
responsible for processing specific information or genes that 
are expressed in a given brain region and in turn affect formation 
of a particular behavioral program. Such genocentric and 
modular approaches to the human mind clearly collide with 
Vygotsky and Luria’s thinking. They suggest that HPF – the 
most developed, complex, and semiotically mediated 
psychological processes – are not strictly localized in the brain 
but are rather dynamically distributed. This approach does not 
suggest that no localized processes exist in a brain whatsoever. 
However, similar to modern evidence (Anderson, 2014), it 
suggests that many complex psychological processes are neither 
functionally nor structurally localized in the brain. Vygotsky 
was critical of Pavlov, who associated cognition with the 
prefrontal cortex and the frontal lobes of the brain. Vygotsky 
argued that while frontal lobes are important for cognitive 
processes, some aspects of these processes could be  more 
precisely localized by activating a given area in the brain. 
According to Vygotsky, real-time processes activate the whole 
brain and the body, as they activate various functional systems. 
In this paradigm, complex cognition is not an entity that can 
be  located “somewhere” but rather a process taking part at 
different locations. For Vygotsky, an appropriate question about 
cognition is not “where” it can be  located but rather “how” 
it is processed. Vygotsky (1997) wrote that “…no specific 
function is ever connected with the activity of one single brain 
center. It is always the product of the integral activity of strictly 
differentiated, hierarchically interconnected centers.” (p.140). In 
other words, psychological processes are better explained not 
by “where” in the brain they are localized, but how different 
functional brain networks interact with each other in real time. 
A similar perspective was taken by a number of researchers, 
including Goldberg (1995), who focused on gradiental approach 
to neocortical organization and Anokhin (1971), who studied 
the theory of functional systems, investigating connections 
between the formation of functional systems and learning. 
Indeed, modern day neurological research supports Vygotsky’s 
arguments and shows that many areas of the brain process 
various types of information (Anderson, 2014). Moreover, studies 
show that specific areas of the brain – associative cortices – 
seem to specialize in information synthesis, it is a-modal 
representation and processing.
Vygotsky (1982) understood the process of development 
from the neurological perspective, in which the brain reorganizes 
neuronal connections and creates new, functional systems. In 
this framework, psychological structures on a neurological level 
become functional relations between neurons, whereas complex 
functional systems “do not mature by themselves but are formed 
in the process of communication and material activity of a 
child” (Luria, 1969, p.  34). This is how the brain, developing 
as a biological organ, also becomes a cultural organ (Toomela, 
2014b). Child interaction with language, cultural tools, artifacts, 
and social environment leads to changes in the brain, developing 
new functional systems. Not surprisingly, a prolonged ontogenetic 
period that in humans is necessary for learning cultural 
knowledge from conspecifics coincides on a neurological level 
with a series of massive rewiring events in the brain 
(de Graaf-Peters and Hadders-Algra, 2006).
The hierarchical nature of functional systems allows for a 
fresh perspective on understanding impairments in brain damage 
and developmental disorders. If we  conceptualize the damage 
as impairment in a functional system instead of a broken 
module, it is possible to separate primary and secondary defects 
that might affect different levels of the system. Damage to a 
hierarchically superior level will affect abilities at a lower level 
as well. Similarly, damage to a lower level of the system will 
have some effect on that system’s higher levels. For example, 
Vygotsky demonstrated that impairments in visual perception 
are related to impairments in language development, verbal 
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thinking, and, in turn, visual thinking (Vygotsky, 1995). What 
matters is that compensatory mechanisms developed by the 
brain in each case might differ, depending on the age at which 
damage to the system occurred (hence the stage of functional 
system formation). Symptoms that are similar on the surface 
level might be  produced by different psychological processes 
(e.g., in case of brain lateralization and phonological processing; 
Stiles et al., 1998). As Akhutina and Shereshevsky (2014) suggest, 
some modern theoretical perspectives on disabilities, such as 
neuroconstructivism (Johnson and Karmiloff-Smith, 2004), are 
frequently in agreement with aspects of Vygotsky and Luria’s 
work. Drawing on the work of Jean Piaget and systems theorists, 
neuroconstructivism aims to reconceptualize how we understand 
development and change from the perspective of a brain. In 
such reconceptualization, neuroconstructivism applies the 
systemic thinking so prominent in Vygotsky and Luria’s work 
with regard to both typical and abnormal development.
Third, systemic approach can benefit cultural research. 
Throughout the 20th century, psychological research focused 
heavily on the search for “universals” in the human mind. 
These could be universal rules of learning and stimuli response 
in behaviorism; the genetic foundation of behavior; innate 
computational processes in cognitive science and innate modules 
in evolutionary psychology; and brain structures and processes 
in neuroscience and neuropsychology. However, recently, cross-
cultural researchers have questioned this quest for “universal 
human nature.” For example, in their seminal paper, Henrich 
et  al. (2010) demonstrate that the majority of samples in 
psychology research papers come from so-called WEIRD 
populations. The acronym stands for populations coming from 
Western Educated Industrialized Rich and Democratic societies. 
In other words, close to 90% of papers published in psychology 
are based on investigations of about 12% of the global population. 
Similarly, Nielsen et  al. (2017) have analyzed publications in 
major developmental psychology journals (Child Development, 
Developmental Science, and Developmental Psychology), 
concluding that the majority of all samples in published studies 
come from North America and Western Europe and are based 
on English-speaking participants. This situation is troubling. 
A closer look at “human universals” demonstrates that 
psychological abilities vary between cultures: executive function 
(Benson and Sabbagh, 2010), mirror self-recognition (Broesch 
et al., 2011), infant-directed speech (Broesch and Bryant, 2018), 
and population-level differences in developmental trajectories 
by children (Henrich et  al., 2010), to name a few.
Vygotskian cultural-historical psychology provides a route 
for understanding how culture can form mental structures in 
a more mechanistic way. Specifically, how something shared 
and social can become individual and private. Remembering 
that Vygotsky defines culture and cultural tools in a particular 
way is crucial to understanding this point. To illustrate the 
specificity of his approach, we  focus on two perspectives that 
define culture: cultural-historical psychology based on Vygotskian 
theory and the socio-cultural approach that is in-line with 
contemporary Anglo-Saxon and neo-Vygotskian thinking 
(Matusov, 2008). The socio-cultural approach commonly defines 
culture as a human-created environment, artifacts, and practices. 
Toomela (2014b) calls such an approach a-cognitive and 
a-developmental, as it does not explain how mind structures 
change qualitatively in development with the use of a cultural 
tool. Sociocultural schools assign major influence to the formation 
of behavior to environment. Consequently, since from the 
perspective of sociocultural school environment determines 
behavior, there is no need to study individual cognitive levels, 
as such levels are not informative for the understanding of 
individual differences in psychological processes. In this 
framework, development can be  explained solely by describing 
differences in cultural practices. However, as Toomela (2014a,b) 
discusses, this approach ignores the fact that the same practices 
are interpreted uniquely by different individuals. This suggests 
that we  cannot understand the source of individual differences 
solely by relying on the description of cultural practices and 
avoiding any analysis on an individual cognitive level. In the 
systemic perspective, an analysis that neglects the individual 
cognitive level becomes a-developmental. This happens because 
non-systemic approach does not analyze the individual cognitive 
development and implies that during development, the mind 
does not necessarily change qualitatively. Rather, the complexity 
with which a child interacts with its environment increases. 
What we  wish to highlight is not that cultural psychologists 
deny that the human mind changes in development, but that 
the discipline as a whole lacks a mechanistic explanation of 
how this change happens through interaction with cultural 
tools. Researchers tend to focus on describing increasingly 
complex patterns of behavior for a given activity, e.g., social 
cognition, without necessarily linking these changes to other 
domains of the mind.
In discussing Vygotsky’s paradigm of cross-cultural research, 
it is important to mention that Vygotsky’s work was criticized 
as “ethnocentric” (Matusov, 2008). Vygotsky and Luria’s 
expeditions to Central Asia, and later Luria’s research with 
urban, rural, and homeless children (Luria, 1930/1978), aimed 
to demonstrate developmental changes in cognition introduced 
by formal education. This work suggested that people indeed 
tend to apply different problem-solving strategies to a situation 
depending on whether or not they had formal education 
(however, see Van der Veer and Yasnitsky (2016a,b) for a 
critical analysis of these expeditions). Researchers were able 
to replicate the results of many of these findings later (e.g., 
Tulviste and Hall, 1991; Subbotsky and Quinteros, 2002). 
Additionally, modern research acknowledges that the presence 
or absence of formal education is associated with variability 
in various psychological phenomena (Saxe, 1990/2015). As 
Matusov (2008) suggests, the socio-cultural approach opposes 
Vygotsky’s interpretation of cross-cultural differences. In this 
framework, humans in different cultures utilize essentially the 
same psychological mechanisms.
We believe that such criticism of Vygotsky is fair, but only 
if we  do not apply the systemic principle to this problem. In 
a hierarchically organized mind, some psychological processes 
are developmentally early, and some emerge later in life. 
Psychological processes that are associated with the 
implementation of population-wide formal education, such as 
reliance on abstract “scientific” concepts of abstract categorization, 
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are developmentally older. In most cultures and for most 
individuals, all these psychological processes are available, but 
utilized to varying degrees. In culture A, people may largely 
rely on developmentally early strategies to solve a specific task, 
while in culture B the same task is commonly solved by means 
of a developmentally older mechanism. The fact that the mechanism 
utilized in culture A is developmentally younger than the 
mechanism utilized in culture B does not make it in any way 
inferior. In such a framework, ethnocentrism can be  avoided, 
as long as we  acknowledge (1) the diversity of psychological 
mechanisms and (2) the absence of the superiority of one 
mechanism over another based on its developmental emergence. 
In some cases, developmentally early mechanisms might be more 
useful for individuals living in a given environment. For example, 
research demonstrated that in comparison to people living in 
the West, people with limited formal education in non-Western 
societies tend to be  more accurate at perceptual constancy. 
Such results might be  explained by increased demands to 
interpret complex spatial environment for the latter group 
(Ardila and Keating, 2007).
We believe that Vygotsky’s view on culture and its role in 
the formation of the human mind might generate some interest 
from within the field of cultural evolution, which focuses on 
an evolutionary understanding of social change. Cultural 
evolution is a young discipline and is still subject to debates 
that include the notions of progress in cultural development, 
cultural relativism, etc. Cultural evolution aims to understand 
the relationship between culture, environment, and human 
mind. Importantly, the field attempts to unify behavior, culture, 
and biology on a conceptual level by studying human 
development more holistically. It suggests that cultural rather 
than biological changes have significant effect on both human 
evolution and the individual development of the human mind. 
Although the discipline does not rely on Vygotsky’s work 
explicitly, it raises similar concerns such as the extent to 
which the human mind and human behavior evolve from 
cultural processes. We believe researchers working in the field 
of cultural evolution could find Vygotsky’s view on culture 
and its role in the formation of the human mind relevant 
for their work.
The Second Core Principle: Language and 
the Social Origins of the Mind
The second core principle of Vygotsky’s work is the social 
origin of the human semiotically mediated mind and the role 
of language in this formation. Language is one of the central 
topics of Vygotsky’s research, and his writings on language 
development have received much attention on a global scale 
(Lantolf and Aljaafreh, 1995; Frawley, 1997; Goodman and 
Goodman, 2014). In this paper, we  aim to highlight the 
connection between Vygotsky’s view of language development 
and his systemic approach to the development of the mind. 
It is important to reiterate that specific words and terms coined 
by Vygotsky (e.g., “sign as a tool”) are not mere metaphors 
but carry profound meaning and can be  better understood in 
the context of Vygotsky’s general theoretical views. While he saw 
language as a universal feature of the human species, Vygotsky 
was mostly interested in the role it played in human development 
at both the evolutionary and individual levels.
Vygotsky viewed language as an essential component of the 
human experience, a part of human interaction with the 
environment, of human behavior and mind and argued that 
the appearance of language was a driving factor in human 
development (Vygotsky, 1929/1956). He  stressed that through 
language human psychological processes became semiotically 
mediated and thus human cognition is fundamentally different 
from animal one. He  also addressed differences in cognition 
of children before and after they begin to talk. Vygotsky saw 
a linguistic sign (a word) as a cultural tool closely related to 
the behavior of a developing organism. He  argued that words 
were a tool similar to physical tools used by children in joint 
activity with others, as they advance in their development. 
Importantly, the processes of activity are first mastered with 
an adult and later become internalized at the mental level. 
As such, psychological functions are initially interpsychic as 
an activity between a child and an adult or a more knowledgeable 
peer and only later become intrapsychic as individual thinking 
of a child. Consequently, Vygotsky devoted much attention to 
the concept of “inner speech” as a special type of psychological 
activity and suggests that speech develops first in the social 
environment and later becomes internalized into mental processes 
(Friedrich, 2014).
In addition, Vygotsky argued that all linguistic signs are 
dual in nature. On the one hand, their meaning is internalized 
on the individual level – they become part of the internal 
psychological processes (Vygotsky, 1931/1983a; Vygotsky, 1960). 
On the other hand, signs are used in an external activity for 
social communication and in engagement with others. Therefore, 
Vygotsky stressed that tools (including linguistic signs) are 
produced and culturally conventionalized (Arievitch and 
Stetsenko, 2014). If we  accept that meaning of a particular 
sign is socially conventional then we can conclude that humans 
can “share minds” by relying on internal psychological processes 
with socially constructed meanings. Moreover, human cognition 
develops on the basis of extracerebral connections. In Vygotsky’s 
framework, these connections form the basis of regularities 
created in the socio-cultural semiotic environment (Vygotsky, 
1982). We  believe it is important to understand the difference 
between this specific conceptualization of the role of language 
in the development of the mind and a more general notion 
that humans learn from their social environment.
It was important for Vygotsky to study his research subjects 
without isolating them from their cultural-developmental 
context (Toulmin, 1978). Seeing a child’s development as a 
complex process that happens in a close interaction with his 
social medium, Vygotsky introduced a new, comprehensive 
approach that allowed him to observe the child’s psychological 
and linguistic development during interactions with others 
(Cole and Gajdamaschko, 2010; Karimi-Aghdam, 2016). 
Originally, Vygotsky believed that thought and speech performed 
different functions and evolved relatively independently. 
He  mentions a defined pre-speech phase in the development 
of intelligence and pre-intellectual phase in the development 
of speech. He saw similarities in how groups of young children 
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or higher animals communicate without speech (symbols and 
signs): expressive movements, gestures, facial expressions, etc. 
However, he  emphasized that ways of thinking not associated 
with speech exist. Vygotsky believed that the age of two is 
a critical and crucial point in a child’s development. Since 
at that stage, thought and speech begin to intertwine. Vygotsky 
observed that this stage is characterized by the rapid increase 
in the communicative vocabulary of the child. A child first 
discovers the symbolic function of language, understands the 
meaning of generalization as a means of communication, and 
begins to use it for communication and problem solving. As 
Toomela (2014b) stresses, such an understanding of sign 
interiorization brings new potential to different research. The 
concept of “inner speech” as a form of linguistically associated 
psychological process proposed by Vygotsky has found strong 
empirical support and is an active field of modern research 
(Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015; for an excellent review 
see Sawyer, 2016).
The conceptualization of human environment as first and 
foremost a social and cultural one is a hallmark of Vygotsky’s 
work (Stetsenko and Arievitch, 2010; Arievitch and Stetsenko, 
2014) and manifests itself in the work of modern developmental 
researchers (Tomasello, 1999; Rochat, 2001). Tomasello’s work 
in particular is a prime example of researchers’ focus on social 
processes and their role in development. Tomasello argues 
that human-specific psychological abilities develop in human 
infants due largely to the specificity of a cooperative social 
environment (Moll and Tomasello, 2007). Quite tellingly, he calls 
this hypothesis the “Vygotskian Intelligence Hypothesis.” The 
Vygotskian thesis of the importance of a social environment 
for the formation of the human mind is concordant with 
modern research of shared activities, joint attention, development 
of theory of the mind, development of these abilities through 
co-joint actions, embodied experiences, and shared routines. 
Carpendale and Lewis (2004), Racine and Carpendale (2007), 
and Nelson (2007) argue from a constructivist perspective 
that the social environment, including a communicative one, 
actively shapes the mind. Shared routines that are structured, 
embodied, and rich in meaning provide a foundation for 
creating shared meaning, knowledge, and feelings. A child’s 
mind originates in such shared routines that are culturally 
and linguistically mediated and collaborative (e.g., for an 
elaborate account of early lexicon development through shared 
routines, see Nelson, 2003). Such an approach suggests that 
a child experiences the environment as cultural and semantic 
from the very onset of life. As Arievitch and Stetsenko (2014) 
point out, such a view of development is still unorthodox in 
modern psychology. However, it is a viable approach, if 
conceptualized through constructivist relations and is in line 
with Vygotskian thinking.
Applications of the Second Principle
As Vygotsky articulated the importance of societal context for 
education and possible implications for his theory in education, 
the second principle has been recognized in various disciplines, 
namely educational research. Vygotsky argued that learning is 
a step ahead, enduring the further development. While completing 
a challenging task with the help of a teacher or peers, a child 
develops and learns. Vygotsky’s thinking has a clear application 
to educational research, for it highlights the agency of various 
learners and the educational value of a child’s interaction with 
the environment. The role of the teacher, therefore, is to sustain 
this interaction and not simply relay decontextualized knowledge. 
We  believe this is a promising expansion of current work in 
the psychology of learning and classroom research (Moll, 1992, 
2013; John-Steiner and Mahn, 2003; Tudge and Scrimsher, 
2003; Wells and Claxton, 2008). However, there is a wider 
application of Vygotsky’s ideas in education far beyond 
developmental psychology and the theory of childhood speech 
(Davydov, 1995; Prior and Welling, 2001).
Since Vygotsky was interested in how social medium shapes 
the cultural values of an individual, his theory is being applied 
in intercultural language studies. Human cultural and linguistic 
development, Vygotsky writes, passes two stages – first social 
and then psychological or individual. This transition inwards 
has its structure and function, as language and culture become 
internal and fossilized. The most important takeaway from 
Vygotsky’s theoretical framework for educational research, 
we  believe, is that language structures and speech patterns are 
internalized through a child’s development. In addition, from 
this perspective, culture is seen as an aggregate of both material 
and spiritual values manifested in human behavior. As such, 
application of Vygotsky’s ideas to the analysis of miscommunication 
in language teaching allows researchers to postulate that the 
main cause of misunderstanding does not lie solely in language 
proficiency. Communication is in itself an expression of one’s 
lived experience, represented in a symbolic system. While 
interlocutors might share the code, their use of this code could 
vary significantly. The underlying source of miscommunication 
is often the difference in styles of speech and patterns of behavior 
fossilized in communicants, which interlocutors might be unaware 
of. Vygotsky called attention to the fact that communication 
between two individuals is in itself a communication of 
consciousness that occurs in the mind of a carrier of a particular 
culture and seeks to comprehend the symbols of a different culture.
Moreover, Vygotsky’s focus on the role of the societal 
context is relevant for modern developmental science. Vygotsky 
proposes two lines of development in a child – a natural 
line and a cultural one. Such a distinction reflects a conceptual 
question that transcends psychological science throughout 
time: the extent to which biology and environment contribute 
to the development of the mind. Nativism and mainstream 
cognitivism have been criticized (sometimes explicitly) for 
separating these lines of development. Followers of alternative 
perspectives such as constructivism and Developmental Systems 
Theory (e.g., Oyama, 2000; Gottlieb, 2007; Nelson, 2007; 
Griffiths et al., 2012) attempt to demonstrate, both theoretically 
and empirically, that environment cannot be strictly separated 
from the internal biology of an organism. Rather, the human 
mind is constructed by active involvement in the environment 
in which it develops. Gottlieb (2007) describes development 
as processes interacting at different levels, from cellular to 
social. Development in this case becomes probabilistic, and 
any observed patterns can be  explained by similarities in 
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developmental contexts rather than hardwired, genetically 
determined programs. Variations in an environment and its 
relationship to an individual organism affect the formation 
of mind structures. In such a framework, there is no one-on-one 
relation between an organism and environment. Similarly, 
Vygotsky (1931/1983b) and Vygotsky (1933/1934) argued that 
environment should be  studied not in absolute terms as is, 
but in relation to a child. The same environment can be different 
for a 3-year-old and a 5-year-old, as they perceive it differently 
on an individual level and through different psychological 
mechanisms. A strong emphasis on environment as a factor 
in formation of the mind in modern day research is utilized 
in the ecological approach to cognition (Heft, 2001) and 
embodied cognition (Shapiro, 2010) and is in line with 
Vygotsky’s thinking (Karpov, 2005; Falikman, 2014). We believe 
Vygotskian approach can be  applied to DST framework, and 
an excellent example of such application was developed by 
Stetsenko (2009).
Furthermore, modern neuroscience is often associated with 
the question of whether an understanding of human brain is 
sufficient to fully understand the human mind. The answer to 
this question for many contemporary researchers (e.g., Carpendale 
et al., 2010; Karmiloff-Smith, 2018) (and we speculate Vygotsky 
as well) is “no.” As Toomela (2014b) suggests, reductionist 
approach to neuropsychology tends to focus on the brain and 
ignore its relationship with the environment. But in this case, 
we  cannot understand the development of the human mind 
as it develops during constant interactions between the brain 
and environment. The results of multiple studies convincingly 
demonstrate that particular experiences with environment are 
reflected in brain processing, e.g., a canonical study of an 
increased hippocampus in London taxi drivers (Maguire et  al., 
2000); a study by Gaser and Schlaug (2003) on differences in 
brain structure associated with music training (for a detailed 
discussion, see Kotik-Friedgut and Ardila, 2014). Importantly, 
since human environment is a cultural one, an ecologically 
valid neuropsychology should incorporate disciplines such as 
anthropology and semiotics, as these disciplines explain the 
cultural regularities and cultural environment that the human 
brain reacts during development (Toomela, 2014b). The discipline 
of cultural neuroscience (Chiao, 2009) specifically focuses on 
the relationship between brain development and culture. It 
investigates differences in the brain processes of participants 
with varied cultural backgrounds (Han and Humphreys, 2016). 
We  believe that the Vygotskian tradition in cultural-historical 
neuropsychology is in line with recent developments in brain 
research. For Vygotsky, culture is defined as an environment 
of sign and language (Vygotsky, 1929/1994; Vygotsky, 1932/1960; 
Vygotsky, 1935/1994). In cultural development, the sign is 
“internalized” and becomes a part of cognition. A human mind, 
according to Vygotsky, starts with a cultural line of development, 
when children do not simply learn knowledge from adults but 
internalize human-specific cultural tools – linguistic signs. As 
Bakhtin and Holquist (1981) notes “becoming a human being 
… is the process of selectively assimilating the words of others” 
(p.  341). Based on the conceptualization of cultural tools by 
Vygotsky (contrary to more traditional socio-cultural schools), 
it follows that a child can be enculturated from birth. Children 
are not only born in a human-created environment, but in a 
linguistically mediated environment that becomes internalized 
through development. This notion was crucial for Vygotsky. 
Similarly, an answer to the question of whether animals have 
culture would differ depending on how one defines culture. 
This answer can be  affirmative if culture is defined as the 
manufacturing and usage of tools and the ability to modify 
the environment in which an animal lives (Snowdon, 2017). 
However, to Vygotsky, the answer would likely be  negative, as 
for him, culture is mainly a semiosphere, socially shared 
information coded in symbols (Toomela, 1996). In our opinion, 
Vygotsky’s focus on social processes as sources for individual 
cognitive development are in line with the modern approaches 
to cultural research treating culture as inseparable from human 
biology and recognition of the fact that an individual brain 
is immersed in a world of social environment. Not surprisingly, 
contemporary attempts to study culture in a more comprehensive 
way have led to the emergence of interdisciplinary fields of 
neuroanthropology (Dias, 2010), neuropsychology (Brickman 
et al., 2006), neurosociology (TenHouten, 1997), and psychological 
anthropology (Bock and Leavitt, 2018).
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we  sought out to demonstrate that Vygotskian 
thinking can be applied to contemporary psychological research 
and there is a potential for such an application. To this end, 
we  first reviewed historical, social, and temporal contexts of 
Vygotskian work. Knowledge of these contexts is useful for 
understanding aspects of Vygotskian thinking. Following this 
review, we  outlined two core principles transcending every 
aspect of Vygotskian theory, which in our opinion have the 
most profound implication for understanding his approach. 
We  suggest that these principles are useful for modern day 
psychology and are in fact developed by many researchers, 
although such application does not necessarily rely explicitly 
on Vygotskian work. Consequently, we  discuss how these 
core principles can be applied to modern psychological research 
and can assist psychology in solving problems that are still 
important for the discipline (just as they were important for 
Vygotsky). In doing so, we  intentionally do not provide our 
readers with direct precise instructions on how Vygotskian 
approach can be  applied to their work. We  maintain that 
our readers are in a better position to develop specific 
applications of Vygotskian work to their areas of interest. 
Our goal was to outline potential avenues for such applications 
and to invite our readers to further dialog on questions that 
were of interest to Vygotsky himself (such as development 
and structure of the mind, and the role of culture and 
language in it).
In conclusion, we  suggest that although Vygotsky’s research 
took place a century ago and every branch of science has 
made tremendous advancements since then, some of the questions 
he was working on are still left unanswered. Despite limitations 
and outdated aspects of his work, there is a potential for 
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incorporating Vygotskian thinking into modern psychological 
research across disciplines.
We would like to leave the readers with the following reflection. 
Vygotsky envisioned the success of psychology as a science 
only if it sustained its holistic and interdisciplinary nature:
Such a system [of an interdisciplinary holistic 
psychology] has not yet been created. We can say with 
confidence that it will not arise out of the ruins of 
empirical psychology or in the laboratories of 
reflexologists. It will come as a broad biosocial synthesis 
of the theory of animal behavior and societal man. This 
new psychology will be a branch of general biology and 
at the same time the basis of all sociological sciences. It 
will be the knot that ties the science of nature and the 
science of man together. It will therefore, indeed, 
be most intimately connected with philosophy, but with 
a strictly scientific philosophy which represents the 
combined theory of scientific knowledge and not with 
the speculative philosophy that preceded scientific 
generalizations (Vygotsky, 1925/1997, p.  61; c.f. 
Yasnitsky, 2011b).
While a comprehensive reconstruction of Vygotsky’s work 
is yet to be  completed, many of the questions he  was working 
on are still relevant to contemporary research. Indeed, there 
are new perspectives that support early theorizations of Vygotsky 
(see Newman and Holzman, 2013; Subbotsky, 2014; Alfredo, 
2016). We  invite scholars working in these interdisciplinary 
areas to engage with Vygotskian thinking, to explore aspects 
of his thinking by consulting the work of Vygotskian scholars, 
and to develop their own nuanced applications of Vygotsky 
work in their specific research areas.
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